Findings

CVE-2026-85747

Distribution: Client does not verify returned content against requested digest

Published Oct 15, 2026 · updated Oct 15, 2026

### Summary fetches a manifest by digest but never hashes the returned body and compares it against the requested digest. A malicious or compromised registry, or any MITM on the registry connection, can serve arbitrary manifest bytes in response to a digest-pinned request and the client returns the substituted content transparently to the caller. Any application relying on digest pinning for supply-chain integrity — image policy controllers, mirrors, pull-through caches — is silently undermined. The bundled pull-through proxy ( ) is itself an unguarded consumer and is directly exploitable. ### Details **Root cause:** reads the response body and passes it directly to without ever computing and comparing against the caller-supplied . The response header is parsed (lines 251-292 in ) only to populate an out-parameter ( ) and is itself server-supplied — it is never recomputed from the body, so a lying server can set it to whatever value the caller requested while delivering different bytes. **Attack path:** An attacker who controls the registry endpoint (malicious registry, compromised upstream, DNS hijack, or TLS MITM) responds to with: 1. (forged header) 2. A body containing a different, attacker-chosen manifest The client calls on the substituted body, returns the attacker's manifest as if it were the pinned content, and the caller has no way to detect the substitution. **Why it matters:** The entire value of digest pinning is to guarantee content-addressable integrity against exactly this threat model (hostile or MITM server). The pull-through cache calls and immediately writes the result to local storage with no re-verification — so a poisoned remote can permanently inject a bad manifest into the mirror cache, affecting all subsequent consumers. Relevant code path ( , simplified): ### PoC **go.mod:** **main.go:** **Output (v2.8.3+incompatible):** ### Impact Any application that calls with a digest argument — and relies on that digest to guarantee which image conten

Code

The project this record applies to. Exploit listings stay in References.

Timeline

Detection, updates, and resolution for this record.

  1. Oct 15, 2026 · GitHub Advisory Database

    Detected

    ### Summary fetches a manifest by digest but never hashes the returned body and compares it against the requested digest. A malicious or compromised registry, or any MITM on the registry connection, can serve arbitrary manifest bytes in response to a digest-pinned request and the client returns the substituted content transparently to the caller. Any application relying on digest pinning for suppl

  2. Oct 15, 2026 · GitHub Advisory Database

    Updated

    ### Summary fetches a manifest by digest but never hashes the returned body and compares it against the requested digest. A malicious or compromised registry, or any MITM on the registry connection, can serve arbitrary manifest bytes in response to a digest-pinned request and the client returns the substituted content transparently to the caller. Any application relying on digest pinning for suppl

Affected

  • go github.com/distribution/distribution/v3< 3.1.2
  • go github.com/docker/distribution<= 2.8.3
  • golang github.comversion unspecified

Sources

  • CVE.orgVulnerability recordCVE-2026-85747

    Official CVE identifier

    cve.org
  • GitHub Advisory DatabasePackage advisoryGHSA-685w-q87j-wqw3

    Distribution: Client does not verify returned content against requested digest

    github.com
  • GitLab Advisory DatabasePackage advisoryCVE-2026-85747

    registry/client.(*manifests).Get(ctx, dgst, …) fetches a manifest by digest but never hashes the returned body and compares it against the requested digest. A malicious or compromised registry, or any MITM on the registry connection, can serve arbitrary manifest bytes in response to a digest-pinned request and the client returns the substituted content transparently to the caller. Any application

    advisories.gitlab.com

References