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Vulnerabilities

Security fix · CVE-2026-85724

Moquette: Pattern-ACL wildcard injection (cross-tenant authorization bypass) plus a remote-unauthenticated DoS cluster, a Will-message authorization bypass, and a cross-session dur

Published Sep 23, 2026 · catalog updated Oct 19, 2026 · Moquette: Pattern-ACL wildcard injection

Check if you run it

No confirmed exploitation is on record for CVE-2026-85724. EPSS is 0.27%. Act only if a listed version of Moquette: Pattern-ACL wildcard injection is installed.

Gaps on this record

  • The stored product name is a package slug. The name on this page is taken from the title (Moquette: Pattern-ACL wildcard injection).
  • No vendor fix or required action is stored. Compare the linked advisory before you change production.
Severity
Critical9.6
Known exploitation
Not in CISA/VulnCheck KEV
EPSS
0.27%
Remediation
Advisory link
Affected products
Maven io.moquette:moquette-broker

moquette is reachable by untrusted MQTT clients (anonymous by default), so every byte from any client, including pre-authentication, is untrusted. This is a memory-safe JVM: the ceiling is authorization/ACL bypass + denial of service + cross-session integrity, **not RCE** (I did not find one and do not claim one). Audited at commit , module . ## What a connecting client can do 1. (Critical) Bypass -based ACLs across tenants. In (AuthorizationsCollector.java:116-131, esp. line 123) the clientId/username is substituted raw into a pattern ACL rule and then wildcard-matched, and the clientId is never validated for MQTT wildcard characters +/# at CONNECT (MQTTConnection.processConnect): Topic substitutedTopic = new Topic(auth.topic.toString().replace("%c", client).replace("%u", username)); if (topic.match(substitutedTopic)) return true; A client that connects with clientId + turns sensor/%c/# into the filter sensor/+/#, gaining cross-tenant read AND write. (Precondition: pattern ACL rules configured — a common multi-tenant setup.) 2. (High) Crash the whole broker. SessionEventLoop (SessionEventLoop.java:40-54) catches only InterruptedException and is never restarted (SessionEventLoopGroup), so any uncaught exception on it wedges every co-located client. Trivially reachable inputs: malformed $share/grp SUBSCRIBE (SharedSubscriptionUtils.extractShareName -> StringIndexOutOfBoundsException), deeply nested topic (CTrie recursion -> StackOverflowError), and ACL NPE below. Unbounded subscriptions / retained / in-flight / topic-alias / interceptor state (BrokerInterceptor uses an unbounded queue) also allow OOM; durable stores allow disk exhaustion. 3. (High) NPE in ACL sink on clientId # (invalid filter sensor/#/# -> null tokens -> Topic.match NPE at Topic.java:173). 4. (High) Will-message authorization bypass. Last-Will topic is published (PostOffice.publishWill) without canWrite/reserved-topic checks used for normal PUBLISH. 5. (Medium) Cross-session durable corruption. H2Pe

Are you affected?

Enter the version you run. The result uses only the ranges stored on this record.

The check returns affected, not affected, or incomplete. It does not guess a version that is missing from the record.

  • Maven io.moquette:moquette-broker0 → 0.18.1

How to fix CVE-2026-85724

What to do

Three questions, each answered from this record only. Confirm the vendor advisory before you patch.

Should you patch?

No confirmed exploitation is on record for CVE-2026-85724. EPSS is 0.27%. Act only if a listed version of Moquette: Pattern-ACL wildcard injection is installed.

Which versions are affected?

Compare what you have installed with 0 → 0.18.1. Compare the installed version with the linked vendor advisory before you change production.

What should an analyst verify?

CWE-155; CWE-863: Incorrect Authorization. EPSS 0.27%. There is no CISA KEV listing. No Exploit-DB or Metasploit reference is linked. Use the source links for the original advisory.

Code

The project this record applies to. Exploit listings stay in References.

Timeline

Detection, updates, and resolution for this record.

  1. Sep 23, 2026 · GitHub Advisory Database

    Detected

    moquette is reachable by untrusted MQTT clients (anonymous by default), so every byte from any client, including pre-authentication, is untrusted. This is a memory-safe JVM: the ceiling is authorization/ACL bypass + denial of service + cross-session integrity, **not RCE** (I did not find one and do not claim one). Audited at commit , module . ## What a connecting client can do 1. (Critical) Bypass

  2. Oct 19, 2026 · GitHub Advisory Database

    Fix available

    io.moquette:moquette-broker fixed in 0.18.1

  3. Oct 19, 2026 · GitHub Advisory Database

    Fix available

    io.moquette:moquette-broker fixed in 0.18.1

  4. Oct 19, 2026 · GitHub Advisory Database

    Updated

    moquette is reachable by untrusted MQTT clients (anonymous by default), so every byte from any client, including pre-authentication, is untrusted. This is a memory-safe JVM: the ceiling is authorization/ACL bypass + denial of service + cross-session integrity, **not RCE** (I did not find one and do not claim one). Audited at commit , module . ## What a connecting client can do 1. (Critical) Bypass

Sources

  • CVE.orgVulnerability recordCVE-2026-85724

    Official CVE identifier

    cve.org
  • FIRST EPSSExploitation probabilityCVE-2026-85724

    30-day exploitation probability 0.27%

    first.org
  • GitHub Advisory DatabasePackage advisoryGHSA-5f42-97gr-vfhq

    GitHub Advisory Database record mirrored by OSV.

    github.com
  • OpenSSF OSV / OSV ScannerPackage advisoryGHSA-5f42-97gr-vfhq

    Moquette: Pattern-ACL wildcard injection (cross-tenant authorization bypass) plus a remote-unauthenticated DoS cluster, a Will-message authorization bypass, and a cross-session durable-corruption bug

    osv.dev

References

Freshness

Last verified in this catalog Oct 23, 2026. Significant claims (KEV, EPSS, CVSS, affected ranges) come from the source rows above — open the original publisher for the authoritative advisory.