Vulnerability · CVE-2026-98554
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: vlan: ensure sufficient headroom in vlan_dev_hard_header() Callers that only reserve ETH_HLEN or le…
Published Oct 18, 2026 · catalog updated Oct 18, 2026 · the affected product
Open the advisory
Exploitation likelihood is not on this record for CVE-2026-98554. A missing EPSS score is not a low risk. Compare the affected product with the linked advisory before you change production.
Gaps on this record
- No plain product name is stored. The page cannot tell you which product to check.
- No version range is stored. A customer cannot check an installed version against this record.
- No vendor fix or required action is stored. Compare the linked advisory before you change production.
- EPSS is missing. A missing score is not a low risk.
- Severity
- Unknown—
- Known exploitation
- Not in CISA/VulnCheck KEV
- EPSS
- Awaiting synchronization with FIRST
- Remediation
- Not established
- Affected products
- See sources for product scope
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: vlan: ensure sufficient headroom in vlan_dev_hard_header() Callers that only reserve ETH_HLEN or less (such as llc_alloc_frame()), or skbs allocated before dynamic device/headroom changes (e.g. toggling VLAN_FLAG_REORDER_HDR or bonding/team switching slaves), can reach vlan_dev_hard_header() with insufficient headroom and trigger skb_under_panic(). Use skb_cow_head() in vlan_dev_hard_header() when VLAN_FLAG_REORDER_HDR is not set to ensure sufficient headroom for the VLAN header(s) and the underlying device hard header. Use READ_ONCE() to read dev->hard_header_len and dev->needed_headroom as they can be updated concurrently under RTNL (e.g. in vlan_transfer_features()) while vlan_dev_hard_header() runs locklessly on the transmit path. Also avoid LL_RESERVED_SPACE(dev) here so that the extra HH_DATA_MOD alignment padding does not trigger unnecessary pskb_expand_head() reallocations on inner stacked VLAN devices after the outer VLAN header has been pushed.
No affected version ranges are stored yet. Use the vendor advisory before you decide this record does not apply.
How to fix CVE-2026-98554
Recommended remediation
No required-action text, fix commit, or clear fixed-version range is stored yet.
Official advisories
What to do
Three questions, each answered from this record only. Confirm the vendor advisory before you patch.
Should you patch?
Exploitation likelihood is not on this record for CVE-2026-98554. A missing EPSS score is not a low risk. Compare the affected product with the linked advisory before you change production.
Which versions are affected?
Affected version ranges are not on this record. Compare the installed version with the linked vendor advisory before you change production.
What should an analyst verify?
No weakness class is stored. EPSS is not on this record yet. There is no CISA KEV listing. No Exploit-DB or Metasploit reference is linked. Use the source links for the original advisory.
Code
The project this record applies to. Exploit listings stay in References.
Timeline
Detection, updates, and resolution for this record.
Oct 18, 2026 · NIST NVD
Detected
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: vlan: ensure sufficient headroom in vlan_dev_hard_header() Callers that only reserve ETH_HLEN or less (such as llc_alloc_frame()), or skbs allocated before dynamic device/headroom changes (e.g. toggling VLAN_FLAG_REORDER_HDR or bonding/team switching slaves), can reach vlan_dev_hard_header() with insufficient headroom and trigger
Sources
- NIST NVDVulnerability recordCVE-2026-98554
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: vlan: ensure sufficient headroom in vlan_dev_hard_header() Callers that only reserve ETH_HLEN or less (such as llc_alloc_frame()), or skbs allocated before dynamic device/headroom changes (e.g. toggling VLAN_FL
nvd.nist.gov
References
Freshness
Last verified in this catalog Oct 18, 2026. Significant claims (KEV, EPSS, CVSS, affected ranges) come from the source rows above — open the original publisher for the authoritative advisory.