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Vulnerabilities

Vulnerability · MAL-2026-17389

Malicious code in bungoma (npm)

Published Oct 9, 2026 · catalog updated Oct 16, 2026 · Malicious code in bungoma

Open the advisory

Exploitation likelihood is not on this record for MAL-2026-17389. A missing EPSS score is not a low risk. Compare Malicious code in bungoma with the linked advisory before you change production.

Gaps on this record

  • The stored product name is a package slug. The name on this page is taken from the title (Malicious code in bungoma).
  • No vendor fix or required action is stored. Compare the linked advisory before you change production.
  • EPSS is missing. A missing score is not a low risk.
Severity
Unknown—
Known exploitation
Not in CISA/VulnCheck KEV
EPSS
Awaiting synchronization with FIRST
Remediation
Advisory link
Affected products
npm bungoma

This package is part of a large family (100+ identified as of September 2026) of near-identical forks of the Baileys WhatsApp Web library that inject a covert channel-subscription action into the WhatsApp socket layer. On connect, the injected code issues an authenticated FOLLOW query (query_id 7871414976211147) against one or more attacker-chosen WhatsApp Channel/Newsletter JIDs, using the installer's own authenticated WhatsApp session -- silently subscribing the victim's account to channels it never asked to join. The target JID(s) are hidden from casual source review via one of several obfuscation techniques observed across the family: a plain string literal, base64 encoding, base64+XOR, or a char-code array reconstructed at runtime. Some variants instead fetch a mutable, attacker-controlled remote JSON/JS list of target JIDs from GitHub or another host at runtime, letting the target list change after installation without a new npm publish. Every sample in the family shares the same underlying mechanism (a wrapped/patched socket-connect routine that fires the FOLLOW query some seconds after connect), even though the package name, JID value(s), and obfuscation/delivery method differ per fork. The malicious action abuses the installer's own authenticated WhatsApp session to gain reach and subscribers for attacker-controlled channels; it does not exfiltrate credentials, establish persistence, or execute arbitrary remote code. Affected package: bungoma (npm), version(s): 1.1.0, 1.0.1. --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (c67fa681909df2317f4cee0a0e79ece5108d5cd6b50c2511c34372a87d208ed4) The package presents as a drop-in Baileys fork. Inside makeWASocket(), a setTimeout runs ~90 seconds after init, decodes a base64-obfuscated URL (https://main.bwmxmd.co.ke/xmd.json), fetches a JSON list of WhatsApp JIDs, and issues 'follow newsletter' mex queries against each JID using the installer's authenticated WhatsApp session. T

Are you affected?

Enter the version you run. The result uses only the ranges stored on this record.

The check returns affected, not affected, or incomplete. It does not guess a version that is missing from the record.

  • npm bungoma1.1.0, 1.0.1, 1.0.0

How to fix MAL-2026-17389

What to do

Three questions, each answered from this record only. Confirm the vendor advisory before you patch.

Should you patch?

Exploitation likelihood is not on this record for MAL-2026-17389. A missing EPSS score is not a low risk. Compare Malicious code in bungoma with the linked advisory before you change production.

Which versions are affected?

Compare what you have installed with 1.1.0, 1.0.1, 1.0.0. Compare the installed version with the linked vendor advisory before you change production.

What should an analyst verify?

No weakness class is stored. EPSS is not on this record yet. There is no CISA KEV listing. No Exploit-DB or Metasploit reference is linked. Use the source links for the original advisory.

Code

The project this record applies to. Exploit listings stay in References.

Timeline

Detection, updates, and resolution for this record.

  1. Oct 9, 2026 · GitHub Advisory Database

    Detected

    This package is part of a large family (100+ identified as of September 2026) of near-identical forks of the Baileys WhatsApp Web library that inject a covert channel-subscription action into the WhatsApp socket layer. On connect, the injected code issues an authenticated FOLLOW query (query_id 7871414976211147) against one or more attacker-chosen WhatsApp Channel/Newsletter JIDs, using the instal

  2. Oct 16, 2026 · GitHub Advisory Database

    Updated

    This package is part of a large family (100+ identified as of September 2026) of near-identical forks of the Baileys WhatsApp Web library that inject a covert channel-subscription action into the WhatsApp socket layer. On connect, the injected code issues an authenticated FOLLOW query (query_id 7871414976211147) against one or more attacker-chosen WhatsApp Channel/Newsletter JIDs, using the instal

Sources

References

Freshness

Last verified in this catalog Oct 16, 2026. Significant claims (KEV, EPSS, CVSS, affected ranges) come from the source rows above — open the original publisher for the authoritative advisory.